In the investigation committee, the trace evaluation of the BKA turns out to be largely wanton and arbitrary
It is a sentence like a verdict that expresses the massive doubts about the official version of the perpetrator and perpetrator of the attack on Breitscheidplatz in Berlin: “We all do not know whether Anis Amri drove. But after the trace, there were other people in the TRUCK.” The Green Member of the Bundestag Konstantin von Notz said at the recent meeting of the committee of inquiry. The devastating verdict was given to a chief criminal commissioner at the BKA, who could not explain many traces, but still adhered to the official version of the Amri single-offender – as did other BKA colleagues before and after him.
The work of the investigative body is pressing for a consequence: was Amri the man who was sitting in the truck? “We don’t know if it was Amri,” doesn’t mean yet: “It wasn’t Amri.” But we are about to make this statement. Notz now only speaks of the “alleged assassin Amri”. This is less than the formula of the “alleged perpetrator” and much less than the claim: “Amri was the perpetrator.”
The urge to be consistent also includes the question: Why did the central investigators so wantonly commit themselves to the alleged sole perpetrator Amri? The Tunisian was undoubtedly close to the scene at the time of the crime. This is evidenced by the video recording from 8:06 p.m. in the subway underpass at Zoo station. And he owned the murder pistol. He was at least part of a group of perpetrators. But if he wasn’t the driver, someone else was driving the murder vehicle.
This also means that the attack is open. Perpetrators and accomplices are still to be found. Amri can be seen as the first secured accomplice. There is more to this scenario than the official version. Investigators, but also the political investigators in the committees of inquiry, have to deal with other people who were related to Amri – just as thoroughly as with the person Amri and including the not a few V-persons from security authorities in this environment. Due to the almost exclusive concentration on Amri, a lot of time was wasted.
From this point of view, the case also proves to be an example of how an entire device can be manipulated and directed in a certain direction by setting a name – whether intended or not, it must be said.
The questionable evidence in the Breitscheidplatz case is strikingly reminiscent of the failed investigation of other terrorist attacks, such as the NSU complexes or the Oktoberfest bomb in Munich. The (sole) perpetration of Uwe Böhnhardt and Uwe Mundlos in the NSU murder series is just as little proven as that of Gundolf Köhler in the case of the bomb at the Oktoberfest. The following applies to all three terrorist complexes: It was not the way the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, the highest law enforcement agency in the Federal Republic, is. Only: How it was, you can not say at the moment.
The statement: “We do not know whether it was Amri who drove the truck” results from the dubious trace picture. What forensic traces support the assumption that Amri controlled the truck, committed the attack, and shot forwarding driver Lukasz Urban? How can you prove that the fugitive was the driver of the truck if there were no traces of him in the truck? Was there any glass powder on Amri’s clothing, like Urban’s in the truck? Some of the questions in the committee that the BKA criminalists cannot answer clearly.
On the contrary, the trace image makes it possible for other people to be in the truck.
It is now a fact that Anis Amri has definitely not found any fingerprints in the truck cab. Not on the steering wheel, not on the gear stick, on the dashboard, or on the inside of the driver’s door, for example.
Only two Amris finger or hand marks were secured on the outside of the driver’s door. One includes the palm, thumb, and three fingers of the right hand. According to the BKA, the impression was created “as if the door was closed from the outside”. How can you close a door from the outside and then sit in the vehicle? And how is Amri supposed to have done the “magic trick” (Konstantin von Notz), leaving his fingerprints on the driver’s door, but not one more, even though he is said to have been in the truck for 30 minutes and moved? Do the investigators ignore all of these contradictions because they do not fit the theory of the single perpetrator Amri?
“We have no evidence to exclude Amri as a perpetrator.”
The response of the BKA trace coordinator, Chief Criminal Inspector (KHK) A.Q., is tantamount to an oath of disclosure: “We have no information that excludes Amri as a perpetrator.” It brings the Green MEP to the – rhetorical – question of why this tendentious interpretation of tracks towards Anis Amri works at all. Von Notz also gives the answer: “Because the perpetrator is dead.” If he were not dead, one would have to prove his perpetration in court, and that would be difficult with this trace.
So no Amri fingerprints in the truck – and what about DNA? This finding is also more than thin. A mixed track of two people was secured on the steering wheel, but not a complete DNA profile. The share of the forwarding driver Urban is dominant. In addition, it is said quite vaguely in the corresponding note, that Amri is “to be considered” as the second causative agent.
A mixed profile of three DNA traces was also found on that ominous piece of paper with the inscription “HARDENBERGSTR B” (in capital letters), which was only discovered after three weeks in the truck cab. Hardenbergstrasse is the route to Breitscheidplatz. The DNA of the forwarding driver Urban is dominant again, the second is “Amri to be considered”, in addition, there is the DNA of an unknown third person.
The evidence is said to have been overlooked by the actual crime scene group of the LKA Berlin. This is true both in the first phase of securing evidence and during a review on December 30, 2016. The note was discovered during a second review by the BKA track coordinator on January 10, 2017. The truck had been moved through the city twice before. The note was on the dashboard in front of the speedometer. Overlooked by the actual crime scene group there? It’s hard to imagine. And that it was deliberately not saved makes no sense.
BKA-Mann A.Q. do not say whether the note was in the truck from the start and was overlooked or whether “someone put it there”. This means that manipulation cannot be ruled out. The note is otherwise a tear, the back is printed. Where it comes from is also not determined.
In addition to the uncleared DNA trace on the note, there are 13 other open DNA profiles, the BKA witness told the committee. These 13 DNA traces have been secured in the truck driver’s cabin and “in front of the truck”. What was meant by “in front of the truck” was not clear. Maybe the HTC phone. Another unknown DNA trace is dander on the headrest of the driver’s seat.
It is unclear because the evaluation report is still missing, with whom the unknown DNA traces were compared, by whom reference material was collected, by whom not? So far, only the names Ben Ammar and Kamel A. have been mentioned in this regard.
The committee also did not discuss whether there are unexplained DNA traces as well as unexplained fingerprints.
Amri’s HTC phone, oddly found in a truck body hole, has two photos that must have been taken after the attack. Members of the Bundestag committee had come across this in the files.
The unexplained find was an issue weeks ago. There is now an official technical explanation for this from the BKA. A letter to the committee said: “It can be excluded that the image files were recorded with the HTC Amri.” Instead, they are image files from websites that the Google app automatically offers to the user as so-called preview images on their device and that they have been buffered in a cache file. The BKA also identified the web addresses on which the two pictures would be displayed. However, a direct connection between the images and the website was not found, which is “probably only on the server-side at Google,” the letter says. However, the BKA assumes that the images can be assigned to the corresponding websites.
Unresolved questions about the truck
There are also fundamental questions about the tool kit, the 40-ton semi-trailer from Scania. It reached its maximum weight because it had loaded steel girders and was bulkier than the Tat truck from Nice, which caused over 80 deaths on July 14, 2016. Did Amri know that the truck was fully loaded? – asked committee member Volker Ullrich (CSU). Was it a coincidence – or did someone consciously choose this vehicle because it had a heavy load? Did you know in Italy that the truck was going to Germany? Who loaded it there? Has the choice as a weapon been made in Italy?
Questions that the BKA also have no answers to, but which lead to the Italian scene of the terrorist attack in Berlin and the end of Amri’s flight in Sesto San Giovanni near Milan. Where he died, the later Tat truck had picked up a package as the last load nearby on December 16, 2016.
What skills does someone have to have to be able to drive such a heavy, long, and bulky vehicle? Especially at night in the rush hour traffic of a big city. Amri is not even known to have had a car driver’s license. Once the V-man “Murat” chauffeured him in a car from North Rhine-Westphalia to Berlin. The professional truck driver was Amris landlord Kamel A.
The truck drives into the market at around 50 km / h and is then braked to zero over a distance of 70.80 meters, as in a serious traffic accident. And still the driver should have left no traces? Sweat, blood, hair, dander. And the accident left no traces on him? Injuries, abrasions, bruises, blood. Whether without or with a seat belt. Were there any corresponding traces on Amri’s body? That is also unclear.
The committee is considering, it was said, to commission its own opinion. The parliamentary committee of inquiry of Baden-Württemberg once practiced such a procedure in the NSU complex.
No supporters, supporters, or accomplices?
The number of people, possibly co-accused, who were close to the scene at the time of the crime is increasing: In addition to Amri’s roommate Khaled A., his confidante Ben Ammar, Walid S. or the brothers Ahmad and Bilel M., the committee has discovered that this may also be the case Feysel H. was at Breitscheidplatz shortly after the crime. Amri had probably met Feysel H. at the Fussilet Mosque an hour before the attack. The committee also found that Ahmad M. was there, who even left the mosque a few minutes before Amri. This means that three to four people at the meeting point have already been identified.
The BKA identified a total of over 300 possible contact persons for Amris in Germany. 43 were classified as “potentially relevant to the crime”. Above all, the Berlin area, including the radical center Fussilet Mosque. There were a number of telephone surveillance and apartment searches in Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia. In Dortmund, Amri had used an accommodation that was curiously located on Mallinckrodtstraße, where a former NSU crime scene is also located.
Under no circumstances should there have been any know-it-alls, supporters or accomplices, nothing “crime-relevant”. At least with Ben Ammar, however, there was a well-founded suspicion. However, he was deported, as were half a dozen other Amri contacts after him. Suspicions were ignored or weakened – be it the presence at the site of the attack or DNA on the crime pistol.
The clientele consisted of violent jihadists, drug dealers, and organized crime (OK), who were not strictly separated, on the contrary, they overlapped and mixed. The best example was the physical conflict between Amri accomplices and other Arabs in a drug bar belonging to the Abou Chaker clan in July 2016. Ahmad M., who was in the Fussilet Mosque with Amri on the evening of the crime, incidentally had the alias “Ahmad Abou-Chaker”.
Identity of V-people unclear
The BKA representative, Chief Criminal Inspector (KHK) D.G., who is responsible for the investigations into the contact persons, answered questions about whether there were any BKA sources in the vicinity of Amri. Were there any reports from sources from which knowledge emerged? Also: no memory.
It is known that the BKA in Berlin led at least two V-people in the scene.
The BKA’s investigators also asked the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) for information on Amri’s contact persons – and that included all 300, as further examination in the committee showed. When asked by MP Benjamin Strasser (FDP) whether this was helpful for the investigation, KHK D.G. replied that it was a “very complex question”. Thereupon Strasser: “Actually a relatively simple question.” There was no answer.
The State Protection Department of the LKA Berlin, which initially took over the direction of action on December 19, 2016, was quickly convinced that the event on Breitscheidplatz was an Islamist attack. For Berlin, she compiled a list of 40 people who were classified as possibly involved in the crime and who were visited at 11 p.m. at home or in mosques. At first, however, nothing more was carried out than these whereabouts checks.
The other committee of inquiry, that of the Berlin House of Representatives, did not find out who it was. The name Anis Amri was not among these 40, explained the person responsible for the Mobile Operations Command (MEK) and search groups, Stefan Redlich, who carried out these checks. About half of the suspects had been processed when the name Amri became known on the afternoon of December 20, 2016. As a result, the personal checks were ended and only searched for the fugitive. Amri’s confidante, Ben Ammar, had been gone for ten days. To this day, the investigators cannot say where he was.
It can be assumed that among the candidates there must have been police and constitutional protection officers. Their identity is also not yet known. Members of the Left Party in the committee of inquiry of the Berlin parliament, in particular, have been trying for some time to find out how the informants from the security authorities were integrated into the BAO City investigation after the attack. So far they have not succeeded. Instead, the impression is solidified that a real taboo is also built around these V-people. After all, the MEK head at the time, Redlich, explained that someone from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution had worked in the so-called “Investigation subsection”.